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j oe l w e s ter dale

Fiat homo: Redeeming
Frost via Nietzsche

R

obert Frost’s most famous poem — perhaps America’s most
famous poem — has lately undergone a makeover. “The Road
Not Taken” (1916) has long inspired self-help gurus, Madison Avenue ad
agencies, and graduating valedictorians who read its closing lines as a celebration of rugged individualism and the hearty pioneer spirit. But recent
years have seen a shift in the poem’s popular reception. In a 2013 episode
of the Netflix comedy-drama Orange is the New Black, an inmate invokes
the poem to justify her unconventional approach to earning parole, only
to be chastised by another for her naiveté: “Everyone thinks the poem
means to break away from the crowd and, like, do your own thing, but if
you read it, Frost is very clear that the two roads are exactly the same. He
just chooses one at random, and then it’s only later at a dinner party when
he’s talking about it that he tells everybody he chose the road less travelled
by, but he’s lying.” The speaker may be on to something: according to the
poem, the one road is “just as fair” as the other; they are worn “really about
the same”; they each lay “equally.” Met with only vacant expressions, the
speaker continues: “So the point of the poem is that everyone wants to
look back and think their choices matter, but in reality, shit just happens
the way that it happens and it does not mean anything.” Smugly unleashing her liberal arts education, our privileged inmate echoes interpretations
of “The Road Not Taken” that have long circulated among scholars of
American poetry. Decades ago Frank Letricchia pronounced the poem
“a wolf in sheep’s clothing,” arguing that while it may on the surface
seem to celebrate the autonomous self, it actually points to the ultimate
irrationality of the choices that define us. Frost himself called it a “tricky
poem — very tricky,” claiming in public readings to have based it on his
friend, the Welsh writer Edward Thomas, with whom he would take long
walks while living in England, and who, regardless of which path he took,
would lament he did not go the other. If the only thing distinguishing
one road from the other in the poem is simply the fact that one is taken
while the other is not, the choice of one over the other hardly seems
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evidence of the speaker’s nonconformity, and representing it as such, as
he imagines he will one day do, would appear to be disingenuous.
Though the fictional jailhouse crowd may prove unreceptive to this
reading, it has found purchase in the outside world, largely with the help
of David Orr’s 2015 book, The Road Not Taken: Finding America in the Poem
Everyone Loves and Almost Everyone Gets Wrong (Penguin). Orr, a poetry
columnist for the New York Times, distinguishes between the naive reading
of the poem that has long dominated the poem’s popular reception and
which bills it as a paean to individualism, and the cynical reading, which
sees it as a study in self-deception. As per the book’s title, the popular
reading “gets it wrong.” Getting it right, however, comes at a cost. While
cynical readers, like the astute inmate, may revel in their cleverness, their
reading largely reduces the poem to a melancholic parody. Neither the
naive nor the cynical reading is particularly appealing; nor is either on its
own particularly compelling. Noting this, Orr promotes an interpretation
that suspends the poem’s audience between the two readings.You go down
one road, and the poem is a naive celebration of individualism; you go
down the other, and it becomes a cynical denunciation of self-deception
in retrospection. By suspending itself between these two possibilities, the
poem instantiates the quandary it portrays — situating the reader in the
position of the lyrical subject who must choose one road or the other but
cannot pursue both. For Orr, the conflicting interpretations reveal much
about the American psyche and the way it understands itself as a product of
the choices we make, even when those choices are not as sovereign as we
like to pretend. Such a reading accommodates both the naive, starry-eyed
nonconformist as well as the cynical inmate, all in a manner palatable to
college professors weaned on irony and lyrical performativity.
And yet, even if scholars reading the poem as a symptom of American culture may want to keep this poem suspended, such a reading both
relies on and belies the desire of individual readers — who want the
poem somehow to land. The poem itself may reproduce the quandary
it describes, but any reader who keeps its meaning suspended refuses to
do precisely that which the poem says must be done, that is, to make
a choice. A reading which would suspend judgment already tacitly acknowledges that neither option on its own is particularly compelling.
There is, however, another avenue of interpretation — one that, like
Frost’s poem, recognizes the impulse to reinterpret the past, but does so
without yielding to cynicism or resorting to irony. This mode of reading
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finds precedent in a figure with little connection to Frost beyond a shared
regard for Emerson; a figure whose own self-representation has aroused
suspicion; a man who proclaimed “I am not a man — I am dynamite!” For
all his eccentricities, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) offers a positive mode
of reading one’s past that recognizes the perspectival nature at the root of
any account of the self and sees this not as a liability, but as an opportunity.
The approach Nietzsche takes to his own past furnishes a way to read Frost’s
poem that enables the work to retain the empowering declaration of
autonomy espoused by the naive reading, while taking into consideration
and moving beyond the cynicism that informs the poem’s recent reception.
In the three years before the collapse that ended his productive life,
Nietzsche entered into a sustained phase of self-reflection at least partially informed by material concerns. In 1886, E. W. Fritzsch of Leipzig
had purchased from Ernst Schmeitzner the rights to and, importantly, the
many unsold copies of Nietzsche’s earlier works, including The Birth of
Tragedy; Human, All Too Human; and The Gay Science.While C. G. Naumann
was publishing his current writings, such as Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond
Good and Evil, and The Genealogy of Morals, the purchase and promotion
of the earlier works by Fritzsch presented Nietzsche with the opportunity to revisit them anew. Based on Nietzsche’s correspondence with
Fritzsch and the many emendations to be found in the author’s personal
copies of these earlier works, Nietzsche clearly would have preferred to
revise them, but much to his dismay, the publisher would not allow it
until the remaining printed copies were sold. What he could do was
write new prefaces or append new material. The body of the texts, however, were already printed and could not be altered.
This presented Nietzsche with a quandary, for the philosopher’s
thought had undergone significant transformation in the years since he
had written these works. No longer was he the Romantic Nietzsche of
The Birth of Tragedy, who saw the promise of redemption in the works of
Richard Wagner, nor was he any more the scientifically-inclined aphorist
of Human, All Too Human and The Gay Science, whose ability to topple
temples outstripped his capacity to erect alternative architectures. Now
he was the philosopher of the Will to Power and the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, the author of Thus Spoke Zarathustra and father of
the Übermensch. The earlier works, while still recognizably by Nietzsche’s
hand, stood on the other side of a conceptual watershed. Still, Nietzsche
would not renounce them. He would, however, reinterpret them for his
283

T HE MASSACH US ET T S REV I EW

readers.Thus arise the new prefaces for The Birth of Tragedy, Human, All Too
Human I and II, Daybreak, and The Gay Science. There were other amendments (for instance, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music became The
Birth of Tragedy, Or Hellenism and Pessimism through the addition of a new
title page; and The Gay Science gained an entire fifth book of aphorisms),
but with the new prefaces, Nietzsche did not alter his earlier works so
much as resituate them from the perspective of his later philosophy. This
exercise in self-representation would culminate in Nietzsche’s last completed manuscript, Ecce homo, Or How One Becomes What One Is.
Completed in late 1888, shortly before the collapse that would end his
productive life, Ecce homo marks what should have been a turning point in
the middle-aged philosopher’s career. In it he pivots from all but his most
recent works and prepares the ground for his upcoming yet ultimately
unrealized grand project, The Revaluation of All Values. Even as he moves
beyond them, he does not altogether abandon these earlier publications.
This is clear from the unambiguous title of Ecce homo’s third section,“Why
I Write Such Good Books.” As with the new Fritzsch editions, he does
not set out to change these works, but to find a way to affirm them. This
enthusiastic affirmation is the hallmark of Ecce homo, and is also apparent
from the titles of the book’s other three sections: “Why I Am So Wise,”
“Why I Am So Clever,” and “Why I Am a Destiny.” Such titles easily
arouse suspicions of megalomania, appearing to be early indications of the
philosopher’s pending mental breakdown.Yet what may seem a symptom
of oncoming madness is in fact entirely consistent with the method of
self-reflection and self-portrayal Nietzsche lays out explicitly at the outset
of Ecce homo, and which accounts for the affirmation with which he greets
all his works, however superannuated.
Nietzsche launches Ecce homo, which he began writing on his fortyfourth birthday, with a statement that reveals the method he will pursue
in this self-study:
On this perfect day, when everything is ripening and not only the
grapes are turning brown, a shaft of sunlight has just fallen on my life:
I looked backwards, I looked ahead, I never saw so much and such
good things all at once. . . . How should I not be grateful to my whole life?
And so I tell myself my life.

Thus begins the account of a man compelled to retire early because he
was plagued by migraines and nausea, a transient whose ceaseless search
for relief from somatic distress separated him from friends and family and
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colleagues, a scholar whose deteriorating eyesight threatened his chief
occupations of reading and writing, a writer whose unsold books lay
gathering dust. This man is grateful not only for the good life brought
him, but for his whole life: his ill health, his loneliness, and even those earlier books that he would at this point actually rather revise, but may not.
This is not just a statement of affirmation; it is a declaration of method.
Such is evident in the passage’s final, somewhat odd statement: “And so I
tell myself my life”—“Und so erzähle ich mir mein Leben.” Others have read
this “so” sequentially (as in, next I’m going to tell myself about my life) or
conclusively (and therefore I’m going to tell myself about my life). But the
more natural reading of the original German is unambiguous:“And in this
way I tell the story of my life to myself.” Read thus, Nietzsche makes it
clear from the outset that Ecce homo is quite deliberately written to reflect
a spirit of gratitude derived from this single moment. Here Nietzsche exemplifies the concept he claims lies at the heart of Ecce homo, namely the
unconditional affirmation he calls amor fati, the love of fate. His “formula
for human greatness,” as he calls it, is this:“not wanting anything to be different, not forward, not backwards, not for all eternity. Not just enduring
what is necessary […] but loving it.” By embracing his own past, including those works he has effectively put out to pasture, Nietzsche affirms
even that which he might otherwise be tempted to want to change; he
renounces the desire to alter a past over which he has no power.
This notion of amor fati has its roots in one of Nietzsche’s more notoriously perplexing concepts, the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. The
latter finds its most concise formulation in the penultimate aphorism of
The Gay Science’s original edition, where he presents the following hypothetical situation:
What if a demon crept after you into your loneliest loneliness some
day or night, and said to you: “This life, as you live it at present, and
have lived it, you must live it once more, and also innumerable times;
and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and
every thought and every sigh, and all the unspeakably small and great
in thy life must come to you again, and all in the same series and sequence . . . ”—Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your
teeth, and curse the demon that so spoke? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment in which you would answer him: “You
are a God, and never did I hear anything so divine!”. . . [H]ow would
you have to become favorably inclined to yourself and to life, so as to
long for nothing more ardently than for this last eternal sanctioning
and sealing?
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Immediately thereafter Nietzsche introduces the figure of Zarathustra
into his writing, closing the first edition of The Gay Science with the appearance of the mage.
In the course of the book to follow, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche
has his title-figure present the affirmation of the past as one of the greatest
challenges confronting the Will. It is where the Will “gnashes its teeth”;
it is its “loneliest affliction,” for the Will is “powerless against that which
has [already] been done.” Past choices cannot be unmade. Redemption,
so preaches Zarathustra, can only be achieved through affirmation. He
says, “To redeem the past and transform every ‘it was’ into a ‘thus I willed
it!’ – that alone would be redemption to me.” Through such affirmation
of the past, through the ability to assert “thus I willed it,” one redeems
oneself from the desire that the past be otherwise. The Will no longer
experiences the past as a limitation on its power, but rather as an extension of itself.
One finds traces of this logic in Nietzsche’s most famous statement,
“What does not kill me makes me stronger.” Surely the source of the
sentiment’s popularity cannot lie in its actual veracity — it is demonstrably false. Rather, the maxim’s appeal stems from the attitude it expresses.
It fortifies one’s ability to cope with adversity, both present and past, and
enables one to draw strength from all eventualities. Such an approach
arms one against the inexorableness of what has gone before, not by actually altering the past, but by recasting it as, if not fatal, then inevitably
empowering.
The unqualified affirmation that motivates Ecce homo stands at odds
with Frost’s depiction of the friend who ostensibly inspired “The Road
Not Taken.” Given Edward Thomas’s pervasive second-guessing, the poem’s title would suggest an element of regret. This is compounded by
the irreversibility of the speaker’s choice: “knowing how way leads on to
way / I doubted I should ever come back.” But what the lyrical subject
actually claims to regret is not the particular road he chooses, but rather
the fact that he has to choose at all. The formulation is as clear as it is
odd: “Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,” the poem famously begins,
“And sorry I could not travel both / And be one traveler, long I stood.”
In this peculiar formulation, it is not the splitting of the roads that vexes
him, but that he cannot split himself — he must “be one traveler”— that
is why he “could not travel both” and therefore must make a choice.
The individuum here longs to be a dividuum. The poem thus harnesses
the quandary of choice to the issue of self-identity. Being an individual
286

Joel Westerdale

demands choice, while at the same time, making choices is the stuff of
individual identity. It is precisely that which makes “all the difference,”
regardless of how comparatively well the road is travelled.When the lyrical “I” pauses — “And I — / I took the one less traveled by” — the
subject splits and multiplies, dramatizing this moment of decision. The
decision here, however, is not which path to take — he made that choice
at the beginning of the second stanza — but rather how to interpret and
describe that choice. In this moment, he asserts his interpretive autonomy,
that is, he determines the manner in which to interpret his own choice,
and thereby that which derives from and defines our individuality.
The subtitle of Ecce homo —“how one becomes what one is”— makes
this intellectual autobiography not so much a chronicle of historical
events as an explanation. Such would also seem to be the anticipated
objective of the lyrical subject’s future self, looking back on this moment at the splitting of the road: not to provide an objective account of
events without interpretive intervention, but to explain how he became
the person he became. The lyrical subject foresees himself interpreting
this moment from a very particular perspective in the future in order to
make sense of the present, not to preserve the past. Frost’s poem distinguishes between the lyrical subject who stands at the crossroads from the
proleptic projection of the lyrical subject looking back on this moment.
As Michael Orr would have it, the fourth stanza offers “a projection into
the future [that looks] back upon the present as the past.” But there is
actually no “present” in this poem, as there is no present tense — “two
roads diverged”; “long I stood,” “I shall be,” etc. The lyrical subject does
not actually stand at the crossroads; he is already looking back at the
moment when he was standing at the crossroads. Why does this matter?
Because what we have is not a true account of events compared to which
the projected future account is merely an interpretation. The use of the
past tense establishes a temporal distance between the speaker and the
figure at the crossroads.This distance may be small, but Frost’s poem itself
demonstrates how quickly perceptions can change: he claims he “took
the other, as just as fair / And having perhaps the better claim, / Because
it was grassy and wanted wear.” But then he seems to correct this impression: “Though as for that the passing there / Had worn them really
about the same.” The adverb “really” emphasizes the shift in perception.
What we don’t know is when this shift occurs, at what point the two
paths become indistinguishable from one another. Is it at that moment of
decision, or only later when the speaker looks back? With this in mind,
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the speaker for whom the two paths are interchangeable himself may be
the outlier, where the future self ’s reading of one road being less traveled aligns felicitously with the lyrical subject’s initial impression. Indeed,
without this alignment, the reader could not understand what is meant
by the phrase “the one less traveled by.”
It would seem the poem presents not a conflict between truth and
self-deception, but a tension between diverse interpretations of an event:
the lyrical subject’s interpretation of a past event followed by his speculation regarding a possible future interpretation of that same event. The
lyrical subject anticipates that from some future perspective this choice
will serve as an explanation for events he has yet to experience and
which cannot be foreseen. But even so, the future self he imagines will
own that decision and affirm it by integrating it into his identity. If this
poem leaves its audience with a choice, it need not be between a naive
reading and a cynical one, between a celebration of rugged individualism
and a mockery of self-deception. It is a poem about choice, a choice not
just between two roads, or between two ways to interpret a poem, but
between two ways to interpret one’s own past. It is a choice not between
naiveté and self-deception, but between a nihilistic worldview, in which
“shit just happens,” and the potential to make the “it was” of history into
a “thus I willed it.”
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